Notable Cases

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The Law Offices of Edward J. Singer, APLC, has fought for workers’ compensation rights and litigated various issues that have been reported in Workers’ Compensation Law. The cases listed below are those which have been appealed to either the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board in San Francisco, the California Court of Appeal or the California Supreme Court.

A number of these cases have been cited as legal authority, reported in scholarly works such as Sullivan on Comp, the California Workers’ Compensation Reporter, and commented upon in LexisNexis Workers’ Compensation e-newsletter. Some of these cases have been used for training attorneys at the State Compensation Insurance Fund. Some of these cases have been used for risk management training in Superior Court.

While our offices take pride in assisting individual clients, we also take pride in shaping workers’ compensation case law to benefit all injured workers.

Garcia v. County of Riverside, 2019 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 447

Issue: (Psychiatric Injury—Good Faith Personnel Actions—WCAB, in split panel opinion, rescinded WCJ’s finding that applicant’s claim for 11/30/2017 psychiatric injury was barred by good faith personnel action defense in Labor Code § 3208.3(h), and held that psychiatric claim was not barred, when WCAB panel majority found that actual events of applicant’s employment were predominant cause of psychiatric injury and injury was substantially caused by defendant’s requirement that applicant (who worked as office assistant) perform switchboard duties, and because defendant changed job duties for all employees in applicant’s unit and change did not specifically impact applicant’s employment status, change in duties constituted stressful working condition rather than “personnel action” under Labor Code § 3208.3(h); in finding compensable psychiatric injury, WCAB explained that where defendant raises good faith personnel action defense under Labor Code § 3208.3(h), as defendant did here, WCJ must determine whether employment events causing psychiatric injury were “personnel actions” in that they did not merely arise from stressful working conditions but were actions directed specifically towards employee’s employment status, that WCJ in this case failed to make this determination before concluding that applicant’s claim was barred, and that distinction between stressful working condition and “personnel action” directed towards individual’s employment status is necessary because without distinction phrase “personnel action” would be overly broad and would encompass everything in employment environment that stems from good faith management actions; Commissioner Razo, dissenting, opined that restructuring of applicant’s unit was “personnel action” under Labor Code § 3208.3(h) as it effectively transferred all employees in unit to different positions, and it was lawful, nondiscriminatory and done in good faith, thereby barring applicant’s psychiatric claim as determined by WCJ.

(See generally Hanna, Cal. Law of Emp. Inj. and Workers’ Comp. 2d §§ 4.02[3][a], [b], [f], 4.69[3][a], [b], [d]; Rassp & Herlick, California Workers’ Compensation Law, Ch. 10, § 10.06[3][b], [d].])

Humphrey v. City of San Luis Obispo, 2019 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 467 (Panel Decision)

Issue: (Psychiatric Injury—Good Faith Personnel Actions—WCAB, affirming WCJ’s decision, held that applicant suffered industrial injury to his psyche while employed as city parking coordinator between 5/19/2018 and 7/30/2018, and that defendant did not meet its burden of proving that good faith personnel action, i.e., reclassification of applicant’s position, was substantial cause of applicant’s psychiatric injury for purposes of establishing defense to applicant’s claim of psychiatric injury under Labor Code § 3208.3(h), when panel qualified medical evaluator opined that applicant’s anxiety and depression were caused by overwork and unrealistic work demands on applicant plus applicant’s own internal pressures and expectations, and WCAB concluded that WCJ properly considered entire set of industrial and nonindustrial causal factors as set forth in Rolda v. Pitney Bowes, Inc. (2001) 66 Cal. Comp. Cases 241 (Appeals Board en banc opinion), and determined that while reclassification of applicant’s position was personnel action, it was not reclassification itself that caused applicant’s injury, but rather increased job duties that overwhelmed applicant and substantially caused his injury.

(See generally Hanna, Cal. Law of Emp. Inj. and Workers’ Comp. 2d §§ 4.02[3][a], [b], [f], 4.69[3][a], [b], [d]; Rassp & Herlick, California Workers’ Compensation Law, Ch. 10, § 10.06[3][b], [d].])

Leggette v. CPS Security, 2020 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 3, 85 Cal. Comp. Cases 321 (Panel Decision)

Issue: Injury AOE/COE—Pleading Injury as Specific Injury or Occupational Illness—West Nile Virus—WCAB rescinded WCJ’s finding that applicant, while employed as security guard on 9/23/2018, did not sustain industrial injury in form of West Nile Virus (spread by mosquitos), and issued new decision finding industrial injury, when WCAB concluded that WCJ erred in finding no injury on basis that applicant failed to specify and prove exact date he was bitten by infected mosquito for purposes of supporting claim of specific injury, and determined that (1) where Application for Adjudication of Claim form had options to plead either specific injury or cumulative injury, applicant correctly asserted specific injury given that his West Nile Virus arose out of single mosquito bite rather than longer period of exposure, (2) industrial injury may be specific and at same time constitute occupational disease, which is separate concept from cumulative injury and may result either from single exposure or exposure over extended period of time, (3) in alleging industrial injury on 9/23/2018, applicant here was alleging last date he was employed in occupation exposing him to hazardous condition, i.e., mosquitos and daily mosquito bites that he was subjected to based on location of his job site, (4) injured employees do not generally need to distinguish between date of potential exposure and Labor Code § 5412 date of injury unless it is relevant to issue in case, nor is there statutory requirement to show exact date of exposure, especially in cases such as this, where pinning down precise date would be nearly impossible, and (5) applicant met burden of proof to establish injury AOE/COE in form of West Nile Virus.

Issue: Due Process—WCAB reversed WCJ’s decision disallowing lien claimant’s lien for chiropractic treatment rendered to applicant after 11/7/2003 and held that lien claimant was denied due process, when WCJ did not inform lien claimant of the scope or purpose of trial as it related to his lien, thereby depriving lien claimant of opportunity to present relevant evidence as to reasonableness and necessity of treatment provided to applicant. [See generally Hanna, Cal. Law of Emp. Inj. and Workers’ Comp. 2d § 30.22.]

(Issue: WCAB rescinded WCJ’s finding that applicant suffered 2 percent permanent disability as result of industrial injury to her left shoulder while employed as performer/greeter/park character on 9/17/2013, and found permanent disability in accordance with panel qualified medical evaluator Jasper Mann, M.D.’s finding of 15 percent whole person impairment, when WCAB found that Dr. Mann’s opinion was sufficient to rebut strict AMA Guides rating under

Almaraz v. Environmental Recovery Services/Guzman v. Milpitas Unified School District (2009) 74 Cal. Comp. Cases 1084 (Appeals Board en banc opinion), aff’d sub nom. Milpitas Unified School Dist. v. W.C.A.B. (Guzman) (2010) 187 Cal. App. 4th 808, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 112, 75 Cal. Comp. Cases 837)

Opinion Filed November 17, 2009; Hector E. Hernandez (Deceased), Geana Hernandez (Widow), Applicant v. City of Los Angeles, PSI, Defendants, 2009 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 520, Opinion Filed October 5, 2009 (Issue: Retroactive Application of Death Benefit Statute for Disabled Minor)

Opinion Filed September 18, 2014 (Issue: Minor’s eligibility for Workers’ Compensation Death Benefits when Widow elects CALPERS special death benefit)

Opinion Filed July 19, 2011 (Issue: Application of 1997 PDRS when Applicant had three level fusion)

Opinion Filed October 15, 2007 (Issue: Sudden and Extraordinary condition of employment when there was a collision at work)

Opinion Filed June 30, 2010 (Issue: Entitlement to TTD when Applicant retired but continued to perform self-employment)

Opinion Filed December 2, 2009 (Issue: Whether Defendant could take credit for overpayment of TTD when Applicant did not cause the overpayment)

Opinion Filed September 26, 2008 (Issue: How is 6 months employment calculated for purposes of psychiatric claims)

Opinion Filed January 5, 2010 (Issue: Whether an injury be caused by Insurance Company misconduct during litigation)

Opinion Filed May 31, 2011 (Issue: Application of credit is within the discretion of the Workers’ Compensation Judge)

Opinion Filed December 3, 2010 (Issue: Whether injury AOE/COE where there was a going and coming rule where Applicant re-parked her car)

WCAB Panel: Commissioners Cuneo, O’Brien, Murray (concurring, but not signing) Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Panel Decision)2007 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 23

(Issue: Entitlement to TTD beyond two years where the injury involved an amputation but where the TTD for an unamputated body part)

Opinion Filed December 16, 2011 (Issue: Substantial evidence to support a finding of injury due to parvovirus)

Opinion Filed December 24, 2010 (Issue: Applicant allowed to develop record concerning earnings related to her occupation)

Opinion Filed January 14, 2013(Issue: Labor Code Section 132a applied when probationary employee terminated)

Opinion Filed September 5, 2006 (Issue: Car accident going home from work was industrial.)

March 14, 2008 (Issue: Applicant’s entitlement to VMRA benefits when there were 2000 and 2004 dates of injury)

December 18, 2013 Writ of Review Denied (Issue: Psychiatric injury and internal medicine injury supported by substantial evidence)

January 30, 2008 (Issue: Petition for Reconsideration timeliness when it was mailed to the local office in San Francisco and not the actual offices of the WCAB

Opinion Filed November 3, 2008 , Petitions for Publication Denied by Court of Appeal December 2, 2008; Petitions for Publication Denied by Supreme Court January 28, 2009 (Issue: Statute of limitation did no bar an Applicant when the applicant did not have “lunch room” notice concerning workers’ compensation rights and benefits)

Writ of Review Denied June 25, 2008 , Review Denied August 20, 2008 (Issue: Whether a collision at work was a sudden and extraordinary condition of employment for the purposes of pursuing a psychiatric injury?)

February 3, 1999 (Issue: Labor Code Section 132a discrimination when Defendant threatened Applicant with discipline if she missed more days of employment)

February 4, 1999 (Issue: 100 percent disability for fibromyalgia supported by substantial evidence)

September 8, 1998 (Issue: Cardiovascular injury for Police Officer supported by substantial evidence)

January 16, 2013 Writ of Review Denied (Issue: Whether attorney leaving her home to return to work after appearing in court the prior day was industrial)

May 28, 2013 Writ of Review Denied, Review Denied July 24, 2013. Review denied by City of Pasadena v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. & Roy Mayes, 2013 Cal. LEXIS 6193 (Cal., July 24, 2013) (Issue: Can there be a 132a violation when an Applicant is a probationary employee)

December 30, 1997 (Issue: Penalty in delaying authorization for pain clinic)

(Board Panel Decision) (Issue: Substantial evidence found for psychiatric injury when there was credible testimony, a treating doctor report indication causation, and an AME report?)

Opinion Filed May 27, 2010 (Issues: Ogilve, Earnings and Psychiatric injury due to a sudden and extraordinary condition of employment)

Opinion Filed May 4, 2015: Issue: Did the Required Vehicle Exception apply when YMCA child-care site director suffered a compensable injury to her neck, back, chest and other body parts in a car accident on 8/21/2013 while en route to off-site, work-related meeting at Del Taco.

Opinion Filed November 3, 2014: Issue: Was dismissal valid when was unclear from dismissal order whether the objection was reviewed by WCJ or whether WCJ reviewed objection and concluded no good cause was shown for applicant’s failure to prosecute.

The WCAB granted reconsideration and ruled that “[s]ince lawful, good faith nondiscriminatory personnel actions are causative factors of an industrial psychiatric injury, they cannot be “other factors” for the purposes of section 4663.

Thus, by the plain language of sections 3208.3 and 4663 factors of lawful, good faith nondiscriminatory personnel actions are not apportionable, as any permanent disability caused by these factors is permanent disability caused “by the direct result of an injury arising out of and occurring in the course of employment.”

“Permanent Disability-Apportionment-WCAB, granting reconsideration, rescinded WCJ’s finding that applicant delivery person was entitled to award of 4 percent permanent disability for 5/6/2016 industrial injury, after apportionment to nonindustrial condition based on orthopedic panel qualified medical evaluator’s opinion, and WCAB substituted new finding that applicant was entitled to unapportioned award of 7 percent permanent disability, when WCAB reasoned that, in determining apportionment of permanent disability, physician’s duty is to determine what percentage of permanent impairment was caused by industrial injury and what percentage of impairment was caused by factors other than industrial injury, that to constitute substantial evidence on issue of apportionment, physician must detail exact nature of apportionable disability and set forth basis for apportionment according to correct legal principles, that here panel qualified medical evaluator upon whom WCJ relied assigned 5 percent whole person impairment

[*2] pursuant to DRE Category II in AMA Guides based solely on presence of muscle spasm and apportioned 40 percent to nonindustrial causes, but did not discuss in his report or deposition how nonindustrial factors contributed to presence of muscle spasm and instead referred to MRI which showed degenerative spine changes that panel qualified medical evaluator admitted were not basis of his impairment determination, that while applicant may have nonindustrial pathology and while applicant’s back “condition” may be 40 percent attributable to nonindustrial causes, relevant inquiry is causation of impairment found by reporting physician, not amorphous “condition,” and that because defendant did not meet its burden of proof on issue of apportionment, applicant is entitled to unapportioned award.”

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